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Abstract
I will start this Essay by saying that it is fundamentally misleading to assume that the dis-
agreement over the shape and content of the agenda for the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”)
negotiations that broke-up the Seattle’s Conference is either the only or the real stumbling block
to maintain the pace of trade liberalization. It also is misleading to assume that the present busi-
ness as usual look that has prevailed since February 2000 in Geneva, means that the substantive
problems are over and that everything is just fine. In my view, we face other kinds of conflicts.
The first is the strong competitive reforms that should be implemented in an important number of
Members of the System. The second is the existing political obstacles to putting together an ac-
ceptable comprehensive agenda of negotiations. The third is the lack of political will to rethink the
present state of play to overcome these fundamental problems without weakening or neglecting
WTO’s genuine role.
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND DANGEROUS
POLITICAL GAMES
Jorge B. Riaboi*
Men and nations will act rationally (only) when all other pos-
sibilities have been exhausted.
-Murphy's Law
INTRODUCTION
In May 1999, while entering the U.S. Congress to deliver a
speech, I was caught off-guard by an unexpected remark that
came from behind. "HeyJorge, are you still fighting for agricul-
ture's trade liberalization?" The voice belonged to Richard
Schroeter, an excellent friend and a former outstanding U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture negotiator during the Uruguay Round.
"Yes Rich," was my instinctive, perhaps defensive reaction after
greeting him, "I am still underground."
Our comments were, indeed, both a bitter and a serious as-
sessment of the state of play in the multilateral trading system
("MTS"). In my view, they also reflected the skeptical mood pre-
vailing in most World Trade Organization' ("WTO") Members,
in particular the vast majority of the countries in the Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"),
on the extent and possibility of furthering the multilateral trade
liberalization process. This sentiment has gone beyond the lim-
ited concept of lost momentum that would only have supposed a
temporary crisis over an issue or a negotiation. We had these
kinds of setbacks before and the system emerged stronger every
time.
Today the picture looks different and this Essay is an invita-
tion to review some facts from a broader and pragmatic perspec-
tive. In some ways, the allergy to liberalization has been flourish-
* Member of Argentina's Permanent Foreign Service and former Deputy Repre-
sentative of Argentina to the WTO (1992-1998); acting Chairman of the WTO's Com-
mittee on Agriculture and Chairman of the Agriculture Negotiating Group of the Free
Trade Agreement on the Americas ("FTAA"). The views expressed by the author are
strictly personal.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOl. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Agreement].
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ing over the last few years and certainly it was there long before
Seattle's WTO Ministerial Conference (or "Conference"). It af-
fected the reactions of most governments attending that Confer-
ence, regardless of their national export interests and import
sensitivities. At the meeting itself, the sentiment of lost momen-
tum was clear in the actual decisions and body language ex-
pressed by some key WTO partners, actions that were in notori-
ous contrast to official statements about their support for trade
liberalization.
Therefore, I will start this Essay by saying that it is funda-
mentally misleading to assume that the disagreement over the
shape and content of the agenda for the WTO's negotiations
that broke-up the Seattle's Conference is either the only or the
real stumbling block to maintain the pace of trade liberalization.
Otherwise the solution would have been a rather simple manage-
ment issue and a compromise might have been reached very
quickly.
It also is misleading to assume that the present business as
usual look that has prevailed since February 2000 in Geneva,
means that the substantive problems are over and that every-
thing is just fine. There is a big difference between shuffling
papers and making progress. In my view, we face other kinds of
conflicts. The first is the strong competitive reforms that should
be implemented in an important number of Members of the Sys-
tem. Many of them have not made the necessary structural ad-
justments to address the threat posed by low-cost foreign suppli-
ers that are exporting in full compliance with the present WTO
rules. While the relevant economic sectors could be considered
competitive under the set of relative prices and other market
conditions prevailing in the majority of OECD members and
some emerging economies, they are completely unable to meet
the challenges posed by low-cost producing suppliers from the
rest of the world. This fundamental contradiction between
socio-economic realities, the ability to compete and the multilat-
eral obligations could explain many of the trade and economic
distorting proposals tabled by main partners of the MTS and also
the public or silent backing of others.
The second is the existing political obstacles to putting to-
gether an acceptable comprehensive agenda of negotiations.
The third is the lack of political will to rethink the present state
of play to overcome these fundamental problems without weak-
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ening or neglecting WTO's genuine role. Governments are
yielding to domestic pressures that are requesting a non-trade
agenda that is alien to the system and also may destroy its effec-
tiveness. So, in fact we are witnessing a not very orderly effort to
provide an acceptable political reply to some of these and other
controversial questions.
I. IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
Is the WTO a useful tool or a problem for the richest coun-
tries of the world? If it is a problem, how far and for how long
are those countries going to pretend that they have a real inter-
est in retaining the present version of the MTS with or without
the enlarged non-trade agenda conceived to appease their pro-
tectionist constituencies?
A. Some Core Problems of the WTO's Main Partners
Leaving aside, for arguments sake, the political issues in-
volved, which will be taken-up below, it is self-evident that the
WTO's main partners and other high-cost producers are facing
at least three core problems for which they do not have clear
and efficient answers.
1. New Negotiations and Obsolete Protectionist Policies
First, it is evident that the new negotiations must deal with
sensitive issues like the deepening of the agricultural reform pro-
cess, a requirement for freer competition, which brings into
question the validity of the traditional model adopted by socie-
ties that claim the right to preserve their domestic sectors iso-
lated from the conditions prevailing in the international mar-
kets. The results of the Uruguay Round did not touch, up to
now, any structural feature of that model, but this coffee break
could be over in the next negotiations. For these countries or
regions, the WTO's contractual obligations to reduce protection
and subsidies that might arise from future disciplines and the
simultaneous participation of more and new unpredictable com-
petitive players in this sector is a problem, a risky straitjacket, not
a promising trend. How can they fulfill its mainly political
pledge of being good citizens of the world and the System and,
at the same time, retain their current policies as they are stated
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in the Agenda 20002 or in Japan's new agricultural policy for
example?
2. Incompatible Economies
Second, the existing relative prices, intellectual resources
and economic organizations of rich societies are not, at this junc-
ture, efficient tools to face the real competition posed by non-
agricultural goods and services that come from low-cost produc-
ing countries and non-market economies (Economies in Transi-
tion) of Asia, Eastern Europe, and potentially other regions of
the world. Under the stringent rules of the MTS, there are no
efficient trade remedies to keep these products out of their mar-
kets, much less if this has to be done under improved new rules a
few years from now.
In addition, there is also a neglected problem of incompati-
ble economic systems and trade organizations (like the prevail-
ing influence and incidence of State Trading Enterprises, their
rules and practices) that will obviously survive for a medium and
crucial term yet to come, which poses important questions that
require immediate and non-rhetorical answers. The dimension
of the problems involved can be observed in the case of the
United States. Despite its dramatic increase in productivity over
the last ten years, it has not been able to solve, fortunately for
the rest of the world and its economic growth, the dramatic and
constant increase of its trade deficit. The sudden shock of
awareness and concern became evident in the WTO, very late in
the process, while discussing competition rules to be applied to
China. The arbitrary way of reacting by many Members of the
System to the low-price imports coming from Russia and other
prospective WTO Members confirms that there is a big unset-
tling issue before us.
3. Lack of Consensus
Third, the WTO has not even been able to reach consensus
to cover key traditional and new high technology sectors, such as
electronic commerce, air and water transportation, or to find
good solutions for large economic activities like government
procurement. These are sectors able to mobilize strong lobby
2. Berlin European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Mar. 24-25, 1999), available at
http://www.europari.eu.int/summits/berl en.ntm.
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efforts in developed countries and yet face some hesitation and
doubts in some developing nations.
B. Need for Change?
What changes and decisions are needed, if any, to incorpo-
rate the high profile and politically influential acceding coun-
tries with non-market economies to the actual WTO chain of
command and its decision-making process once they become
Members? Is it realistic to assume that they will accept as a
mandatory reference most of the outcome of Quad3 meetings in
the corridors, like the rest of the present WTO membership?
1. Domestic Social Concerns
Can the WTO survive as a useful tool if domestically un-
resolved social conflicts are exported to Geneva? Some of these
issues are tailor made for international marketing purposes such
as the discussions on environment, labor standards, civil society
participation, transparency, and human rights or incredible in-
tellectual creations (or should I say provocations) such as rules
on animal welfare and food quality. To be precise, does anyone
think that the actual competition problems that are being faced
and hidden by key OECD members, can be overcome by using
these issues to distort the traditional main goals of the MTS?
4
2. Anti-WTO Demonstrations
How can the regular Ministerial Conferences be held con-
structively, at least every two years, as it is presently mandatory
under the Marrakesh Agreement, if the attention will be artifi-
cially diverted towards what happens in the streets rather than to
striking compromises in the negotiating rooms? How many
Members will offer their cities to host this display of high-tech,
3. Canada, Japan, European Union, and the United States.
4. This does not imply a wish to ignore the need of dynamic adjustments of the
agenda, including the introduction of new issues in the WTO that are compatible with
the goal of consolidating the disciplines and market access concessions that represent
the main assets of the system.
It goes without saying, that these intended rhetorical questions are not a tricky
attempt to oversimplify or ignore the genuine problems of unrest or existing domestic
social pressures. The idea is just to underline the weak political will that exists to deal
with these problems in their real domestic perspective and the remarkable favorite op-
tion adopted by many Governments of sending these society debates to the outside
world.
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highly funded, and "officially tolerated" or "sympathetically
treated" set of disturbances? Which are the ideas that could pro-
vide a methodological approach to get a constructive negotiat-
ing agenda and the simultaneous consolidation of the MTS?
II. POLITICIZATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEM
The liberalization allergy has many origins and also has
been with us for some time now. Not being able to openly admit
in the international arena the extensive support given to their
political domestic movements, the preachers of this doctrine
came to realize that after many years and efforts invested in a
strong defense of unsound trade technical arguments the mere
repetition of that strategy based in hiding things under the car-
pet would not easily fly in the framework of WTO's mandatory
new negotiations. Added to it, they also have noted that real
competition problems reflected in the structural unemployment
faced by some European OECD countries, notably neither the
United States nor Canada in the last years, generated extra com-
plications to the new strategy envisaged at the time of the discus-
sions held on the Agenda 2000 in the European Union.5 Similar
discussions and decisions were adopted in Japan, Korea, Norway,
Switzerland, and other countries, many of them linked to an-
cient cultural perceptions or prejudices. Except the United
States, most other OECD countries do not have a persistent
trade deficit. On the contrary, some of them are enjoying enor-
mous trade "wins" in the last five years or so.
No wonder then, long before the timing of my Washington
lecture it was possible to witness a combination of fear and politi-
cal pressures on the mandatory negotiations that resulted in a
creative spree of "new concepts." They included protectionist-
friendly ideas such as "globalphobia," the Millennium Round,
the rephrasing of the concept of agriculture's multifunctionality
already present in Environmental Agreements and FAO declara-
tions, animal welfare, food-quality, the toying with confusing or
confused proposals on rules of origin, competition rules for agri-
culture, a big push on selected rules for environment, everything
added late in the process to the mostly invented non-trade con-
cerns, a horizontal push for incorporating everywhere, the pre-
5. A picture that will become even more complicated by the incorporation of 13 to
15 new Eastern European members.
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cautionary principle (as part of the policies to "take care of con-
sumer concerns"), and other similar pieces of "modern art."
This puzzle was aimed at aborting, or at least smoothing,
any serious attempt at lowering import protection and subsidies
in agriculture and, in a way, reducing selectively the speed of
liberalization in many other sensitive sectors of the System as
well. Deliberations held at WTO's Committee on Agriculture in
the context of the process of Analysis and Information Exchange
on many of these issues only confirmed previous impressions
about the actual goals and architecture of this approach.
Recently, in September 2000, Commissioner Pascal Lamy
went conceptually farther in presenting this European extrava-
ganza, when he was trying to sell the idea that tariff protection in
the European Union is not that bad or high6
Deliberately, for the reasons expressed below, I am not go-
ing to invest time or space discussing the actual technical con-
tent of proposals that might give a constructive first impression
(this must be left for the negotiating process itself), because they
should be partly identified, in my view, with the same approach
that derailed Seattle and could have similar effects in future de-
cisions. For example, while it is very positive to see the Euro-
pean Union's decision binding-the WTO tariff-free conces-
sions granted to its former African, Caribbean, and Pacific
("ACP") colonies (considered to be least developed countries)
as a token of good will in the context of a dynamic broad market
access approach-a second reading could indicate that the net
effect of that move is relatively symbolic.' Most of this package
only represents a legal reaffirmation of the existing trade status
originated in political commitments acquired a long time ago by,
some of the Communities Member States. An equivalent deci-
sion taken by other WTO Members could mean, in turn, the
6. For a regional agreement that has, according to an inaccurate OECD estima-
tion, elaborated not taking into account the implication of its entry price regulations,
an average level of protection for its main 600 trade agriculture sectors which oscillates
between 50%-60%, depending on if we are discussing plain Most Favored Nation tariffs
or in quotas tariffs, in which there are several key tariffs peaks exceeding ad valorem
equivalents of more than 100% or 200%, that comment represents a curious under-
statement about the Community's "achievements" in the area of trade protection. See
OECD, Review of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers Tariff Regimes of the Quad Countries,
TD/TC(97)11/REV1 (2-11-98).
7. This is contained in the E.U.'s "Everything but Arms Proposal" tabled at the
WTO.
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need for dealing with possible sensitive issues (of the kind al-
ready raised by some developing countries highly dependent of
their trade relations with the European Union).
The Millennium Round proposal also was seen, at the be-
ginning, as a flawless initiative to assure active participation by all
WTO Members in the new negotiations. Before assessing Sir
Leon Brittan's approach and the elements attached to it along
the way, his proposal attracted rather firm support of key Mem-
bers except the United States and Canada. Some Members were
so enthusiastic about it that they even created an informal sup-
porting group called Friends of the Round.
They shared the idea of pushing for a comprehensive ap-
proach aimed at having food to feed all of the WTO's trade ap-
petites in order to achieve a constructive and sincere involve-
ment of its whole membership. However, this group did not
want to associate itself with a tactical instrument aimed at intro-
ducing a little bit more than horizontal cosmetic progress on
every single issue regardless of its trade value or effects or to
avoid making actual headway in particular sectors. At a certain
point in time they read the European strategy as a way to miti-
gate the impact, as much as possible, of the differential liberali-
zation efforts needed in economic activities that were lagging be-
hind in the System (such as agriculture and textiles). Most
Friends of the Round did not want to use this approach as a
political instrument to corner further the United States and
others that retreated from its expected liberalization push in Ge-
neva. There was no advantage for the System in singling out that
the United States has decided to preserve itself as an aggressive
leading trader, but it was, and still seems to be, not so excited in
preserving its role as a trade leader. I also still do believe, how-
ever, that a comprehensive, relatively short and realistic agenda
of negotiations is a way to regain the strength of the System.
In the last few years, the so-called "globalphobia" sentiment
also has been employed by some parties as a politically tinted
excuse to pollute the substance of the entire WTO negotiations.
It is true, that so far the globalization process has not yielded
even results, or a sense of progress to all countries and regions of
the world. But nobody could expect that the increasingly inter-
connected global village called the world would become any-
thing more than the factual data of a new trade setting that
brought different opportunities and some severe problems. The
2000]
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real answers to this challenge are found in instrumenting a bal-
ance, comprehensive and deep liberalization process as a while,
a vision that clashes with the notion of just having a selective,
self-centered choice of sectors that favor the'economic growth
model of some societies and close the reasonable options for the
economic models of other societies. Only a rational conver-
gence of the two, based on a market-oriented approach and ap-
plicable disciplines, will do the trick.
"Is globalization a good thing?" asked Commissioner Lamy.'
"Yes, if steered in the right direction," he answered himself.
"This is becoming ever more important: unfettered, unhar-
nessed, unsteered globalization could become a high speed,
heavily loaded truck careening down a slippery mountain road."
And he added, "[E]ven within the comfortable western society,
globalization risks fuelling the sense of powerlessness and inse-
curity, the disenchantment with the world that is becoming so
evident."
The message sent by this preaching has been, "yes we be-
lieve in the virtues of trade liberalization and abstinence, but ab-
stinence (as trade liberalization) could be regarded as a virtue
only if practiced in moderation." (And when practiced by
others, perhaps?)
So, this feeling and some other unclear artificial confronta-
tions disguised as new demands of particular constituencies re-
jected by the majority of Members of the MTS were used as de-
vices that might have the effect of freezing the System's effi-
ciency. Readers not familiarized with the WTO should
remember that a majority is seldom a useful instrument, since
voting is not well regarded in a System accustomed, for good
reasons, to take its decisions by consensus.
The possibility of having a de facto freezing of the MTS
through an inappropriate agenda is a danger that has to be care-
fully considered. For politicians living in the WTO's main part-
ner's capitals, it may be difficult to grasp the enormous gap that
exists between the needs and the perceptions of their societies,
and those prevailing in the rest of the membership, in respect of
having a strong and efficient System. For the two lesser influen-
8. Pascal Lamy, Challenges Confronting the World Trade System Today, First An-
nual Lecture of the European Affairs Review (Nov. 8, 2000), available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/trade/speeches-articles/spla36_en.htm.
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tial Quad members (Japan and Canada), the economic middle
powers and the developing constituency, it would become ex-
tremely difficult to face the need of dealing in a world deprived
from enforceable rules to conduct trade. A world without a
strong MTS might host multiple trade, economic, employment,
and other conflicts of unknown but extremely important size.
Some of those conflicts are already present and expressed in a
revival of racist and other social and economic isolationist ten-
dencies.
While the United States and the European Union could
manage to survive, not very smartly (how would they create more
market space for new technologies in a planet composed of sev-
eral trade fortresses having the shape of closed individual na-
tions or regional trade agreements?), but comparatively easier in
the hypothetical absence of an efficient MTS, basing their ex-
pansion and protection trade needs on the simple enforcement
of its domestic legislation, this option is a non-starter for the rest
of the world. This cannot become the case for nations that do
not have that power. For them, the WTO is not an option, but
rather the only option to conduct their business without falling
into the risk of being injured by the consequences of unilateral
trade misconduct or hard slaps in their economic faces.
The sharp difference in trade participation and retaliation
power, also marks the different survival capacities at the interna-
tional market beyond those trade territories that might remain
in place and alive within regional trade agreements. It does not
require a lot of imagination to understand that the unilateral
trade retaliation power of a developing country based on a do-
mestic trade law to defend its interests is a toothless instrument,
because its measures could not possibly or earnestly hurt the in-
terests of international offenders. One can only retaliate when
prohibiting or punishing trade actions from another party could
mean real damage to it. In that sense, international law to con-
duct trade has no possible substitutes.
Under these circumstances, the frequent informal discus-
sions held between the United States and the European Union
after Seattle on the possibility of deciding, both in their individ-
ual capacity and on the "involuntary" behalf of the WTO's re-
maining membership, the incorporation or exclusion of trade
interests that belong, in their own right, to any constructive and
intelligent agenda that might help launch something similar to a
2000]
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comprehensive round, has come to be, in practice, a minor
point. Until it is clear that the System will get reasonable politi-
cal backing to stay alive and move ahead, which is very far from
what it is, at present, an unquestionable certainty. Only then will
the importance of fighting for incorporating these "minor
points" to the negotiating agenda be recaptured, since they draw
the line between more prosperity and inevitable marginalization
of countries which do not influence the numbers of a global ta-
ble and have scarce possibilities of adjusting at the needed speed
their present basket of trade interests.
It must be recalled that the political climate created at the
WTO's preparatory work handled in Geneva and the subsequent
failure to launch the new negotiations at Seattle were neither a
surprise nor an accident. They reflected a tacit understanding
that there was no collective interest in making a real effort to
overcome an expected collapse. The Third WTO Ministerial
Conference also showed, despite most biased guesses, that the
result was not linked to one of the usual suspected deal-breakers.
While it was possible to strike a very imperfect agreement on
terms of reference ("TOR") for the agriculture chapter in the
Green Room, that option was not available at the time of discuss-
ing the size and TOR for the remaining negotiating package.
For once, agriculture could not be blamed for being the brake
of the System.
Everybody knew that the proposed Draft Declaration was
loaded with implementation issues and several new issues that
were bracketed. Most of them were dead on arrival. The level of
conflict and the non-existence of momentum were translated
into unattainable proposals and counterproposals that merely
expressed the political unreadiness of the critical mass of the
WTO's membership to strike a deal.
A confirmation that we did not arrive in Seattle under the
influence of mysterious or unannounced ghosts is that many of
the previously informal discussions showed that the U.S. govern-
ment, and through it the rest of the System, knew well in ad-
vance that Seattle would be neither a celebration party at the
Conference rooms nor in the streets. So, no surprises there.
Worse, when Seattle was being prepared, everybody had
fresh memories on what went wrong in the previous and Second
Ministerial Conference held at WTO's headquarter in Geneva.
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Convened under the assumption that it would be a leisurely
event, a mere housekeeping meeting and "a photo-opportunity
of heads of States and Governments," the innocent gathering
turned to be a messy European style intifada. There, the local
authorities also knew many months before the meeting that ag-
gressive non-governmental organizations ("NGO") supporters
would invade the city.
By now, there are few doubts on the existence of this stan-
dard cycle of "political accidents." They have become a usual
feature in every main international encounter sponsored by
leading multilateral institutions dealing with financial, trade,
and related matters (WTO, International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, etc). To my knowledge it remains unclear how we are go-
ing to proceed in searching for a practical solution to deal with
those standard "accidents" is unclear.
Aside from this apparent weak political interest in a speedy
recovery of momentum to carry forward WTO negotiations and
to give a convincing evidence of backing to the MTS, there are
other elements that should be added to this concern. I am sure
that when the wise Cordell-Hull suggested more than half a cen-
tury ago the need of having "rules for the road" to conduct
world trade, he would not have dreamt of a setting where trade
liberalization was to be perceived, more and more, as a growing
political and economic burden by a considerable number of gov-
ernments, including main stream forces of his own country.
Nowadays it has become fashionable to say, without blushing,
that open markets are not more than a desirable "theory." We
are far away from the days when trade liberalization was seen as a
bright opening to expanding economic growth and jobs and one
of the useful instruments to preserve the environment.
It doesn't matter if these fashionable assertions could not
resist any serious analysis. What has happened in the real world
is that in order to fight back the line of thinking or political
marketing adopted by people such as Patrick Buchanan, Ross
Perot, and other influential trade isolationist minority voices, the
leaders of the main political parties in key OECD nations are
taking over their groundless approach. So, highly eligible politi-
cal leaders keep winning electoral battles, but what the societies
regard as electoral fiascoes are in fact winning the ideology war.
Then, the main casualties of this political game are the world
trade liberalization process, economic growth and jobs, the
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scope of people's welfare options, and, if history has any mean-
ing, the necessary setting to preserve long-term peace.
It does not matter whether you classify this dangerous politi-
cal game as half lies or half truths, since this increasingly popular
line of thinking reflects the notion of interpreting the "wishes"
of national constituencies adopted by political leading classes of
those WTO Members in the last six years or so. Such a trend
means that, in fact, they are borrowing some of their core posi-
tions and selling arguments from NGO consultancy and lobby
networks and installing them in Geneva as new preconditions to
comply with the existing international trade commitments or to
deal with initiatives on further liberalization. Of course, in afflu-
ent societies it is irrelevant if these proposals are not consistent
with their proclaimed goals and that, in fact, they are only an
excuse to artificially protect the competitiveness of rich coun-
tries, instead of reflecting an authentic concern for the well be-
ing of the real poor, the environment, and for getting real civil
society participation around the world. Financial tycoon George
Soros has joined that ideological club by proclaiming what he
has defined as "The Capitalist Threat."
When applied to agriculture trade liberalization the non-
trade concern recipes and other equivalent recipes conceived
for stopping the so-called globalized market threat, you get the
impression that the only way of handling matters in this sector is
to save the isolationist trade approach, by declaring that it is po-
litically sensitive and subject to unavoidable market failures. In
fact, when dealing with agriculture, developed countries, not the
developing poorest countries, are the ones that in practice apply
for the special and differential treatment status (special geo-
graphical conditions, developing areas and so-called other his-
toric non-trade concerns, most of them already covered by the
generosity by the loopholes permitted by the present "green
box" or Annex 2 of the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture).
Any serious economist can easily probe that there is no ac-
tivity more market-oriented and able to meet the classic require-
ments of demand and supply laws than agriculture (including
due reactions to price signals, almost complete transparency,
reasonable atomization of trade entities, standards for food se-
curity, etc.). There is no need or factual reason to treat this sec-
tor as a black sheep.
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During the tactical maneuvering prior to the Third Ministe-
rial Conference, the smartness of the protectionist quarters re-
lied on in creating again an axiomatic framework of sensitivity
around agriculture and claiming its role as a main problem in
the way of launching a round. They presented the above-men-
tioned set of "new" ideas, in the form of proposals aimed at twist-
ing the interpretation of straight economic and social facts.
The insistence on pushing for the merger of the multilat-
eral trade disciplines and arbitrary expressions of social de-
mands, under the assumption that the System will only survive if
it meets the test of civil society acceptance proposed by devel-
oped countries' NGOs, had no real basis or meaning, but did
have an enormous appeal among groups that were not educated
in the importance of keeping the WTO alive and strong. Who
would be reactionary enough, or politically suicidal, as to chal-
lenge that "fair" linkage? "Free trade should not mean a 'race to
the bottom' whereby investment goes where the environment
and labor have little or no protection," said U.S. Assistant Secre-
tary of State Peter Romero.'
A. Political Support for Linking Trade Liberalization With
Social Problems
As a first element, it should be recognized that this state of
play has a high level of support among some world leaders. In
Seattle, President Bill Clinton expressed his sympathy for the ri-
oters' demands before 135 world foreign and trade ministers,
but-he clarified-not for their methods. The President of the
European Union Commission, Romano Prodi, spoke recently
(September, 2000) about the Communities' four main goals:
liberalization, better rules, sustainable development, and "re-
sponsiveness to the concerns of civil society."' European Union
neighbors like Iceland, Norway, and some Eastern European" l
and Asian protectionist countries also align themselves with this
position.
9. U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Peter F.
Romero, Remarks to the Inter-American Businessmen's Association (Oct. 27, 2000),
available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/summit/romer27.htm.
10. Only one and half, out of the four goals, are fully compatible with the WTO's
main role as stated in Articles 11:1 and 111:2 of the WTO Agreement.
11. At present, many of those countries are negotiating their accession to the Eu-
ropean Union.
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On the intellectual front, OECD discussions and public dec-
larations have been following the same focus and pattern. Its
most influential governments have been pushing there as well,
the flags of high profile NGOs as a priority task of this efficient,
officially sponsored, "think-tank." Sustainable development,
multifunctionality, novel foods, and similar issues have loaded
the agenda of its main bodies and working groups. I do recall
attending the drafting discussions of an OECD educational doc-
ument having as a proposed title, "The Advantages of Trade and
Investment Liberalization," approved and released in April,
1998, witnessing, to my utter astonishment, that many members
of its Trade Committee would question the "objectivity" and wis-
dom of implying in the title that there were "Advantages in Lib-
eralization." At the same time, it is a well-known fact that the
proportion of work related to the non-trade agenda and related
matters in OECD reflect the notorious interest in prioritizing
these kinds of issues over most other concerns.
A simple mind like mine also has the tendency of bringing
representation into question, because it does not seem to be a
fair balance between the level of NGOs influence, including the
political respect that they have achieved by introducing in soci-
ety important concerns, and the actual level of public adherence
to their implicit way of thinking (I am not implying that political
success or support expressed in numbers means always having
better or deserved credit). If NGO popularity had been stronger
than it really is, instead of being condemned to be both minority
movements and small political parties, then their representatives
would have become by themselves part of the actual leadership
and establishments running the countries. At least this is the
way the concept of democracy, widely accepted in our societies,
has worked where consultations of civil groups and some other
ways of political participation have been ordinary features of this
kind of institutional framework.
This odd relation of force between elected public powers
and non-elected civil society representation, supposes that the
simultaneous right and obligation of governments to contem-
plate all interests and to exercise the responsibility of balance
(you could call that arbitration power), is impaired, in some
democratic societies, when dealing with trade matters. Many de-
cision-makers have chosen to export this national debate to Ge-
neva, where there is a great deal ofjustified rejection and uneasi-
DANGEROUS POLITICAL GAMES
ness about this trend. This option also might clash with the con-
cept of having a MTS based only on intergovernmental
interaction.
B. Emerging Neoprotectionist Mood
In addition, a stock-taking exercise would show that, in re-
cent years, especially in 2000, most substantive discussions about
items of the trade liberalization agenda held in Geneva and else-
where followed a protectionist-friendly trend. Coexisting with
the actions carried out in the WTO, other related negotiations
have shown the same pattern and goals. The content and spirit
of the approved Biosafety Protocol 12 and the effort displayed by
the protectionist headquarters to sell their agenda on "Mul-
tifunctionality" and on the "Precautionary Principle" in the FAO
(and other international organizations, like the International La-
bor Organization, UNCTAD, WIPO, etc.) have been an example
of investing valuable energies in the wrong cause.
That work has been carefully complemented by a wave of
public relations and tactical maneuvers to sell their present strat-
egy conducted by protectionist preachers in Geneva that covered
selected countries and regions around the world. That effort
has included a clever political overture aimed at splitting strong
alliances (e.g., the Cairns Group), through proposals that pick
and choose one flower from each garden. The spread of these
actions confirms that they are not related to an individual setting
or negotiation, but that there is an explicit, well-crafted horizon-
tal policy targeted to get the same result everywhere.
The only piece of good news in this picture is that the WTO
began, probably to comply with the existing contractual inertia,
the mandated negotiations on agriculture, services, and imple-
mentation. Are we on? While it is fair to take into account the
introduction of proposals that are better prepared than ex-
pected, it still is obvious that the real negotiating process has not
yet started.
III. POLITICAL GAMES
As it is known, the questions posed in the introductory part
12. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Feb. 16, 2000), available at http://
www.biodiv.org/biosafe/protocol/signing/ist.asp [hereinafter Biosafety Protocol].
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of this Essay, reflect neither the agenda nor the focus prevailing
in most regular informal discussions about updating some of the
substantive rules and the future WTO's organizational structure.
So far there was no serious attempt to frame these discus-
sions in a long-term view, aimed at evaluating from the perspec-
tive of real politik what could happen if either the lack of will in
consolidating the MTS or, as an equivalent feature, the efforts
aimed at seeking to provide an unbalanced weight to the issues
contemplated in the non-trade agenda and those that could be
labeled as dead wood prevails. This view could affect the previ-
ously agreed WTO goals and the negotiating compromises,
which have allowed the System to yield excellent results over the
last fifty years.
Illustrative examples of dead wood are the proposals on
trade and investment that were presented at the WTO after
lengthy and detailed negotiations held within the framework of
the OECD to approve the Multilateral Agreement on Investing
("MAI"). When the parties involved in that process seemed to
be inches apart from striking an important compromise, they de-
cided to call off the whole exercise.1
3
How can anyone expect to reach a sound and timely agree-
ment on investment in a heterogeneous setting like Geneva,
when the more homogeneous and smaller membership discuss-
ing it in Paris was unable to reach that goal? How can it be ac-
ceptable and constructive to include this initiative in the "noth-
ing is agreed until everything is agreed" WTO traditional princi-
ple? Only to stretch out the deadline for reaching an agreement
in other areas to the end of an eventual comprehensive negotia-
tion? Do Members proposing this initiative ignore this and
other facts?14
13. It should be recalled that both the content of the draft Agreement, and the
"telephone book thick" lists of national exceptions, showed that we would not have
gotten highly ambitious sectoral disciplines and commitments from some participants
in that negotiation.
14. 1 do give credit though, to members that sincerely believe in the benefits of
introducing these kinds of issues. But the point here is not the goals that were submit-
ted, which the main stream of WTO members could sincerely share. The problem is
the practical possibility of achieving constructive results without endangering the rest of
the negotiating process. A sample of the risks involved are the negligible results ob-
tained from the work done by the ad hoc WTO working group, created to deal with this
issue after the Singapore's Ministerial Conference, which after four years of effort are
still not in a position to show a prospective agreement on terms of reference.
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There are several ways of blocking discussions and negotia-
tions under a constructive front. One could be, for example, to
declare urbi et orbi, the possibility of accepting the elaboration of
a comprehensive negotiating agenda without exclusion of issues,
when it is evident that some proposals are incompatible with well
known and long term records on existing policies and practices
already approved by the relevant "constructive" Member or
Members.
When observing this pattern of conduct, a trade negotiator
usually thinks, with good reason, that those proposals or their
standing are not very valuable. They might only have been ad-
vanced to play chicken, to shift on to others the responsibility of
an expected failure, to reduce from the beginning sectoral ambi-
tions of some Members, or to downgrade the commitments aris-
ing from the built in agenda contained in the agreements ap-
proved in Marrakesh.
But there is also a risk for the people involved with this type
of bargaining tactics. It has been proven by the experience of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 15 ("GATT") and
the WTO that there is no agenda item that goes away once incor-
porated into the main stream of negotiations. Sooner or later
there is a price to be paid for that acceptance. Since it looks
unrealistic to suppose that the authors of this political bet were
irrational, the only reading left is that the present proposals are
being tabled with more important second thoughts.
Speaking a little more about tactical matters. One can won-
der why some main users of the present antidumping disciplines
and charges would be interested in making those provisions
more flexible and, therefore, impair its effectiveness as a defense
tool against "unfair trade practices." Why would they be inter-
ested in approaching the line of proposals submitted by the low-
cost and other more competitive producers and exporters on
whom their present defensive disciplines are mainly employed?
Only to show good systemic behavior? Could be, but it sounds
rather unconvincing.
Why some of the main "beneficiaries" of the fading Mul-
15. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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tifibre Arrangement 6 ("MFA") would be interested in discussing
an early implementation of the obligations existing in the pre-
sent Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,17 when after more
than five years of implementation of that agreement they have
been rightly and repeatedly accused of doing exactly the oppo-
site by the main exporting countries?
These doubts have never found a coherent answer while
consulting the actors of this play. This observation does not ob-
scure the fact that Members can change their views or their situa-
tion in the trade scenario. For example, the European Union
Commission has the right, these days, to point a finger at the
United States as the present top sinner in world agriculture and
on several other trade issues. Washington has developed an ex-
tended record for (1) its constant increase of farm subsidies over
the last three years, which domestically it claims with pride has
largely exceeded US$30,000,000,000, (2) its refusal to negotiate
in good faith agricultural export credit disciplines, and (3) its
persistent deviation in implementing the Dispute Settlement
Body recommendations and other standard WTO obligations. 8
At the same time, the United States has a better record and
more objective possibilities to side again with most trade liberali-
zation goals, if their political leadership decides to retake its
Uruguay Round position and drive. Unfortunately, for the time
being, this remains a more fundamental question than a clear
assumption. For doing that, its entire establishment, not only
the Administration, who has to deal with the inner contradic-
tions and restrictions of its economic system and trade policies.
It also is fair to say that the rest of WTO's critical mass is not
quite that far from the main partners approach. With the excep-
tion of Cairns Group and some middle powers that were origi-
nally part of the Friends of the Round Group, and in spite of
their interest in solving some implementation issues,' 9 in prac-
tice, most other Members were registering with some relief the
16. Multifibre Arrangement, Formerly the Arrangement Regarding International
Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840.
17. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, An-
nex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/finale.htm.
18. Such as the Foreign Sales Corporation legislation, its insistence in pushing the
so-called Carousel retaliation approach and its network of trade policy distorting mea-
sures such as those applied on steel, agriculture, sugar, wheat, Byrd amendment, etc.,
and other traditional imports.
19. Like the extension of transitional the Trade-Related Investment Measures
DANGEROUS POLITICAL GAMES
course of events in Seattle, and the relatively quiet trend started
afterwards. Critical mass of the MTS traditionally has meant an
equation composed of those Members who are significant trad-
ers or active or influential partners in the negotiation of key
sectoral disciplines..
The other element that supports this reflection on the
mood that prevails in the System was the generalized indiffer-
ence and silence registered when it already was certain that it
would be daydreaming to launch some form of comprehensive
negotiations before the middle, or end, of 2001, due to signs
coming from Washington and other main capitals. The weak ef-
forts made by U.S. authorities to get fast-track authority were not
the only indication of explicit low priority given by the U.S. ad-
ministration to the WTO process. Indeed, the real problem is
the motive that exists behind this political apathy.
Commissioner Lamy was extremely blunt when he made a
forecast:
I still hold the basic proposition that we have to work out our
differences with the United States before we can launch [a
new round of negotiations]. It may be that 2001 will be a year
of diverse coalition building for both of us, and that we will
have to come together at a later point.20
Keeping the substantive WTO process as it stands means
real trouble for the System. After seeing how the U.S. adminis-
tration had to reopen a closed deal during Mexico's accession to
the North American Free Trade Agreement2' ("NAFTA"), and
the blurred indications coming from the U.S. political debate,
most people in Geneva would not want to discuss any package
based on sketchy information about the price of the eventual
trade-offs that could be part of a major negotiation. The notion
of negotiating twice under defensive conditions, due to the great
deal of uncertainty that exists about the size and content of the
potential final U.S. mandated shopping list, is not a real attrac-
("TRIMS") exception provisions, textile commitments, preservation of Article 8 of the
Agreement on Subsidies, etc.
20. Pascal Lamy, New Round or No Round: Prospects for Resolving Transatlantic
Disputes and Liberalizing Trade, Address at the Tenth Annual Seminar on Trade and
Investment, Wash. D.C. (Nov. 2, 2000), available at http://www.eurunion.org/news/
speeches/2000/001102pl.htm).
21. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [herein-
after NAFTA].
2000]
592 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:572
tion for the rest of the WTO Members. Before Seattle, old tim-
ers would explain to new Geneva generations, that there is some
history in the first failed attempts of round launchings.22 On
that wisdom, let me quote my friend Murphy when he said, "his-
tory does not repeat itself, only historians repeat each other."
An illustrative enumeration of problems could help to visu-
alize the implicit logic of some of the points already made. If
pleasing civil society activists means to give them Internet access
and to try quickly to make documents unrestricted, after their
use cannot have unwanted legal consequences or speculative ec-
onomic effects, as the ones contemplated in the introductory
part of the still applicable addendum of Article XXVIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 199423 ("GATT 1994"),
it should be fine. The same applies to increasing the present
number of periodic seminars with NGO participation and inde-
pendent experts, ignoring there the extra load of work that this
means on the already heavy and complicated agenda of Geneva's
missions. The experience shows that, with few exceptional ex-
amples, trade diplomats and the WTO Secretariat have more to
give than to take in their relation with outside expertise. But
aside from a bad investment of the resource time, there is no
harm in crowding the relative small facilities of the William Rap-
pard Building to please this kind of civil society requests. It is
only an expensive public relations campaign that should be car-
ried out at home by each government, but at the end of the day
these activities might not represent any dramatic breach of the
institutional arrangements that must be preserved.
But if civil society participation means that NGO representa-
tives will be authorized to sit behind a trade negotiator when he
or she is trying to settle a dispute by striking a particular compro-
mise or to propose a trade-off to get a piece of multilateral disci-
plines or to define a market access negotiation, kiss the MTS
good bye, because everybody would be speaking to their constit-
uencies on the room or back home and not to other trade nego-
tiators. In such a setting, no delegation will agree to compro-
mise for less than the national maximum proposed approach,
22. For example, after an attempt made in 1982, it took another four years to get
the Punta del Este mandate for the Uruguay Round negotiations.
23. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. XXVIII, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1184 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
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because nobody in his or her right mind would take the respon-
sibility of looking weak or defeated while being watched or pres-
sured to accomplish unattainable goals.
The same goes for accepting amicus submissions from
NGOs in dispute settlement procedures. This could mean a
core conceptual breach in WTO rules and an extra load of work
for the usually small national teams doing this job, which have
been unable to keep on track all the required tasks demanded
by the official submissions or rebuttals involved in those proce-
dures. This is on top of the fundamental mistake of influencing
WTO panelists with sectoral demands or biased points of view,
not final products (like official submissions that are supposed to
contemplate the balance of all society interests on the issue at
stake) of each Member of this intergovernmental organization.
The same goes for having NGOs observing dispute settlement
cases or watching the General Council activities.
A. Trade and the Environment
Can anyone imagine a trade negotiator agreeing to reasona-
ble trade and environment disciplines while the representatives
of the business sector and the local branch of Greenpeace or the
World Wildlife Fund for Nature ("WWF") are seated next to
each other and him or her at WTO? If not, what is really being
pursued when a government tables these kinds of proposals? Is
this really an approach envisaged to strengthen the MTS?
For the more active sponsors of trade liberalization initia-
tives, including some shy supporters from developing countries,
the incorporation of disciplines on this broad issue could be eas-
ily accepted, provided that you get what is being promised and
not (1) a disguised attempt to introduce legal obstacles to the
market oriented process of investment localization, (2) a new ex-
cuse for preserving legal instruments that could enable higher
border protection, more subsidies, and (3) import prohibition
disciplines that will further impede market access for legitimate
exports, in particular exports of developing countries.2 4
Without necessarily contradicting my intention of avoiding
in this Essay the discussion on particular proposals, it came to my
attention the above-mentioned essay made by the European
24. What has been defined as "eco-protectionism" in the words of a European
Union new proposal contained in document WT/CTE/W/170.
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Union on the relationship between WTO rules and multilateral
environmental agreements ("MEAs"). Some concepts of that
proposal deserve a mere underlining to understand its goals and
approach. For example, the proposal states that unilateral mea-
sures "should be avoided," not prohibited (as it is mandatory
under the WTO rules). It claims opposition to "eco-protection-
ism," something that has been said all along by many Members.
It also repeats the formula of requesting no subordination of
both MEAs and ad hoc, present and future WTO disciplines to
each other, which is an excellent recipe to extend legal limbo
and chaos to every issue. Let me side with my friend Terence
Stewart who wrote an excellent piece of analysis with David S.
Johanson where they said that this formula could give a deter-
mined legal hierarchy to the Precautionary Principle as stated in
the Protocol, if it becomes part of the Customary International
Law through interpretations based on the Vienna Convention.25
The message here is that there is a well-based suspicion, in
some developed and in the vast majority of developing countries
alike that what the authors of these kinds of proposals really wish
has little to do with legitimate claims on environmental preserva-
tion. People perceive these efforts as a cost equalization gadget
to avoid the shifting of investment flows from high-cost markets
to more competitive, and naturally more attractive locations.
In general, most environmental proposals tabled in the
WTO don't even match the standards set by some leading Euro-
pean NGOs, which can be counted among the main advocates
on this issue. In the case of agriculture, these organizations have
repeatedly pointed out that domestic and export subsidies are
clear incentives for the irrational exploitation of already scarce
resources like land and fresh water. In addition, some proposals
tend to clash, for the same reasons, with the main goals included
in the first paragraph of the Preamble of the Marrakech Agree-
ment, which provides:
[E]xanding the production of and trade in good and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development,
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with
25. See Terence Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus on Trade and Environment,
July 2000.
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their respective needs and concerns at different levels of eco-
nomic development.2 6
Without claiming the role of official interpreter of the Mar-
rakesh text, in a setting where individual interpretation is the
name of the game, it is clear that neither the "optimal use of the
world's resources" nor sustainable development can be achieved
by manipulative trade policy, relying on high border protection,
subsidies, and other legal devices allowing the legal overexploita-
tion of resources.
How can we trust that the participants are seeking real envi-
ronmental answers when their proposals are based on the same
approach applied in the effort to introduce at every possible fo-
rum the Precautionary Principle, so far present in Article 5(7) of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures 27 ("SPS Agreement") and in Articles 1 and 11 of the
Biosafety Protocol. 28 Do we wish to apply to novel foods the
same scientific and political wisdom included in the "Salem
Witch Trials"?
All these decisions were conceived to seek the same goal
and are part of one strategy. It is the backtracking of the Uru-
guay Round trade opening aimed at avoiding disguised, non-
trade restrictions in the form of sanitary and phytosanitary
("SPS") policies not based on sound, accepted science. The
whole idea behind this move is the explicit return to the scientif-
ically groundless, zero-risk approach and the claim that only pol-
iticians (in fact their "wise advisers") have the privilege, without
mandatorily taking into account the assessments of the scientific
community, of deciding what is safe or unsafe for consumers or
the environment. Unfortunately, also in the United States, the
protectionist backers are winning ground and getting the sup-
port of government agencies like the Environmental Protection
Agency.
For these and other motives, most WTO Members have seen
the attempt to introduce environmental disciplines as an obsta-
cle to liberalizing efforts. The proposals coming from the funda-
26. WTO Agreement pmbl.
27. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art.
5(7), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/
docse/legal-e/finale.htm.
28. Biosafety Protocal art. 1, 11.
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mentalist, environmental governments speak for themselves.
The main objective behind those proposals is the automatic
WTO legalization of MEAs that include policies negotiated
outside the System's reach, with the dangers involved in that in-
dependence.29 In spite of that, I rescue from those proposals
the principle that is better to have multilateral rules than a legal
vacuum. But not any rules.
B. Trade and Labor Standards
More explicit is the existing perceptions on having labor
standards in WTO. In Seattle, the United States again received
an undisguised rejection of its new attempt to introduce these
standards as part of the WTO agenda of negotiations. Its delega-
tion was clearly isolated by the entire Conference, including the
few strong allies supporting this request (most of them remained
silent). That was not an anti-U.S. sentiment, but an expression
of overwhelming exhaustion from what everybody has perceived
as a proposal conceived by the American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO") leadership or
by its ghost-writers and advisors and activated for political rea-
sons by the U.S. government to retain, artificially, more jobs in
the United States. These proposals are not interpreted as an ear-
nest effort or actual concern for the enforcement of labor rights
around the globe (an activity that could be better served by the
International Labour Organization ("ILO")).
Everybody knows that labor standards would not resist a
round of economic or actual, social policy testing. This kind of
proposal is seen as an application of the principle "if I have to
pay, you should pay as well" and thus gaps in production costs
between countries or regions could narrow or disappear. People
also see this proposal as a simultaneous shot aimed at equalizing
labor costs to promote the attraction of investments or simply to
avoid their relocation to alternative markets.
In fact, the United States has already been building prece-
dents in other trade settings, such as the new version of the Car-
ibbean Basin Initiative and the U.S. Jordan Free Trade Agree-
29. MEA outsiders are not able to play or influence its rules, and the fear of the
European Union and other promoters, is that so far these agreement were never chal-
lenged in the WTO, but of course this could be easily reversed in the future.
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ment,3 ° where labor standards are part of the requirements that
have to be met by the relevant exporters in order to become
eligible for U.S. trade preferences.
Some elements explain the skeptic perception of WTO
Members and countries trying to accede to it on this issue. First,
it is rather odd to say that you support the worldwide application
of long-existing ILO conventions but that there is no room in
the United States for its ratification. Second, there are no clear
explanations on peculiar episodes, such as the U.S. official initia-
tive related to the comprehensive implementation of an ambi-
tious prison labor program to cope with the shortage of labor in
its economy.31
C. Future WTO Members
Another issue that might be part of the hidden causes of the
present MTS standstill is the already mentioned, and not organi-
cally debated, implication of the future presence of new powers,
which are politically influential, low-cost producers, efficient
traders, and still non-market economies expected to get into
WTO in the next few months or years. While these incorpora-
tions are an extremely welcomed development that enriches and
universalizes the MTS, they also demand a methodic under-
standing of their real implications.
This issue cannot be tackled without covering the existing
and future competition rules. Experience gathered in the
framework of particular accessions has already shown that there
is much work ahead on this process. In addition, among the
problems that deserve a hard look are the functions of WTO
rules on State Trading Enterprises, which are not exceptional
features within many of the acceding economies. Attempts to
shed light on this problem have failed in the former GATT and
also in the WTO's short life.3 2 They failed, because many of the
present Members, which are also hosting those entities in their
market economies and in their Economies in Transition,
30. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct 24, 2000, U.S.-Jordan,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/US-JordanFTA.shtml.
31. See Betty Liu, Prison Inmates Offered the Escape of Work, FIN. TiMES, Dec. 30, 1999,
at 16.
32. The only tools available presently are Article XVII of GATT 1994 and the Un-
derstanding on this Article approved in the Uruguay Round and not much more.
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thought that the shots were aimed at their windows and not at an
honest effort to solve the horizontal need of the System.
The postponement of that discussion will always be re-
garded, at a future date, as a major institutional mistake. Only a
mature reply of all the parties involved in this challenge will
avoid a package of sensitive problems and future disrupting
mortgages.
A few words on the WTO's institutional reform. The System
already has been able to make some progress through informal
consultation methods without absorbing the dramatic stand sug-
gested by people who ignore WTO facts (such as the U.N. Secre-
tariat). Other proposals already known on this issue (there were
some in the making while this Essay was written), such as having
Parliament members incorporated to some structure of the Sys-
tem, resemble ILO's corporative ways and means, forgetting that
this could delay the easing of the national bargaining on trade
policy.3" In addition, this has been suggested while ILO looks
for the changing of its organizational scheme to recover reliabil-
ity, deeply weakened by the lack of implementation of the com-
mitments taken by its membership. This does not preclude en-
hancing national efforts to involve more deeply the Parliament
and other expressions of the society in domestic discussions, but
that task is a question of national sovereignty. It would be very
unwise to decide in Geneva how to handle this kind of domestic
affair.
IV. A CONSTRUCTIVE AGENDA
The reason why there is a lack of competitive abilities of
most affluent and some emerging countries' socio-economic
models in relation to those existing in (artificially or real) low-
cost markets does not have an easy answer. Their current, struc-
tural, competitive hardships are very difficult to solve under the
existing WTO rules. This discussion is very tough, if one does
not want to fall into the risk of seeing this approach as an at-
tempt to incorrectly neutralize the competitive advantages of
present and future Members. The impression that to solve such
types of issues the WTO must prepare crazy replies that would
33. Foreign policy, including trade negotiations, is always the kingdom of execu-
tive powers not Parliaments. Therefore, this idea might not become a sample of con-
structive intelligence for the strengthening of the System.
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only mess-up things farther and could undermine, in addition,
the effectiveness of the System must be avoided at all costs.
The effort should concentrate in getting political support
for changes that can remove critical and perhaps justified fears
to its rules without altering the essence and goals of the institu-
tion. A settlement of this nature would still require strong ad-
justments of some traditional trade policies applied by Members,
but this would not suppose the termination of economic activi-
ties that are able to compete under normal international condi-
tions and market requirements in some countries and regions.
Today the quick disappearance of economic sectors is being pro-
duced by reasons not totally known while the present WTO disci-
plines were drafted, like a generalized coexistence of market and
all expressions of non-market economies.
Having said that, I suggest that there is before us a two-tier
task ahead. One is to rethink the organization, improving its
disciplines and the System's market access coverage, to fulfill the
needs of a membership structure that is no longer, for good, a
rich man's club. And, at the same time, it will be necessary to
agree as soon as possible on a comprehensive, realistic, and intel-
ligent negotiating agenda. Both challenges require a tremen-
dous constructive and cooperative drive. That road map should
take into account the warning made during a recent briefing for
top negotiators by Japan's Viceminister of Foreign Relations,
Yoshiji Nogami. He underlined that the present lack of answers
given by the MTS has induced the business community to in-
creasingly click-off the WTO from their screens.
A. The Strengthening of the System: Organizational Issues
In the last fifteen years, there were several discussions on
getting a more transparent and efficient decision-making pro-
cess. Those exercises did not succeed because the powers that
be were comfortable as they stood. They only got a little nervous
with the sudden appearance of the Cairns Group in the Uruguay
Round, as a new party that had to be consulted. Cairns was,
from the beginning, a different type of animal, less easy to con-
trol and very active. But they managed to live with it.
Due to the different size and complexity of the new WTO
membership, some people suggested again, in the last few years,
the possible creation of some kind of executive board of the na-
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ture that operates in multilateral financial institutions, such as
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and in re-
gional plurilateral official banks. This is not, broadly speaking, a
realistic option for the WTO, because we are dealing with a con-
tractual setting, where each Member has to claim its own rights
and respond individually for its obligations. In addition, this
would give a different role and more profile to the Secretariat,
hardly a welcomed development in this institution.
There does not seem to be room, in principle, for dramatic
changes in the global WTO structure to deal with daily monitor-
ing issues, its consultations, and most of its dispute settlement
procedures. But I am not that sure that something similar to an
Executive Consultation Board34 ("Ecoboard") would not help to
discuss new trade initiatives.3 5 The existence of an open, trans-
parent, non-underground body would relieve the tensions that
exist to address better, although not perfectly, the question of
main stream participation, follow up, transparency, and orderly
knowledge of what goes on in the William Rappard Building of
the WTO and other auxiliary places (where the real cooking
goes on).
The Ecoboard would have an environmental name and be
organized in such a way that its work would be linked to the
participation, through consultative building blocks and the pro-
vision of written classified information to the whole member-
ship. This informal body would also facilitate the natural incor-
poration of new comers to the WTO's chain of command with-
out giving the impression that the power management could be
tilted only to suit this particular need. As has been said before,
some progress already has been made on this issue, but more
can and should be done.
The possible existence of more efficient permanent bodies
would also question the organizational need of having, only be-
cause it is mandatory under the Marrakesh Agreement, frequent
Ministerial Conferences (at least every two years) when there is
no real substance to convene ministers, or adequate political
34. An approach less arbitrary than the -presently manipulative Green Room ap-
proach that creates an extreme dependency on the judgment of the people in charge
to convene it and organize the play.
35. Like the informal consultations on the launching of a negotiating process,
structural changes and other issues not automatically well covered by the present offi-
cial chain of commands, bodies and informal settings of the System.
DANGEROUS POLITICAL GAMES
timing to hold those conferences. After three of these exper-
iences and in spite of some excitement in the streets and the
thrill of not knowing if one is going to reach the meeting rooms,
it has to be recognized that this expensive and politically bur-
densome pastime does not serve very well the System as it is now.
Why not have Ministers meet when the menu is ready for their
decisions and not before? Why inflate unnecessarily the political
exposure, the number of engagements, and the budget of the
System? Would that approach not solve, simultaneously, part of
the permanent disrupting linkage between WTO decisions and
the U.S. political and electoral processes? Would in turn the
U.S. leadership be more able to participate constructively in the
WTO by making some of its participation less driven by immedi-
ate and conflictive national political priorities?
Other issues that must be addressed are the need to pre-
serve the Council on Goods (which most of the time is largely a
ceremonial body), the role of the General Council on Trade Pol-
icy Review, and the amount of Secretariat resources devoted to
it, as well as the extremely burdensome notification and counter
notification mechanisms. Also, I am tempted to ask about the
role of the Regional Trade Agreements Committee as it stands,
but it becomes difficult to recommend an alternative solution to
address its present task in any format.
On substance, it seems necessary to assess the de facto role
assumed by the Appellate Body, which in some cases tends to
interpret W-TO provisions under a light that differs from the ap-
proach than that the Uruguay Round participants negotiated
and approved. This unexpected, "almost legislative" outcome
may require some thought and a hard look from WTO Mem-
bers.
B. Disciplines and Market Access Coverage
As an attempt to ease the present tensions and to create a
more stable and accurate setting, WTO disciplines should be
compatible with the present state of the art of fair competition
needs. The only instruments of protection should be the level of
tariffs bindings and the set of legal, non-tariff measures already
present in the System, or their adjusted version and extension if
there is a real need to proceed in that way. The same goes for
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exceptions covered by the balance of payments, safeguards, and
waiver provisions.
Those measures should be improved by recognizing explicit
non-market deviations, like those emerging from improper ways
of assessing costs, the establishment of political prices, and other
operational tools generally available in non-markets and in some
market economies. This includes all the activities of State Trad-
ing Enterprises, irrespective of the economic system in which
they operate, taking into account that those entities usually have
exclusive privileges and goals that differ from "commercial con-
siderations" 36 and are able to apply policies that could hide sub-
sidization, dumping, improper import mark-ups, and other com-
petition irregularities.
Another issue so far ignored in the WTO's trade policy cov-
erage, which is too biased in favor of the contractual legal side
and not enough on the economic realities to which the rules are
applied, is the clear influence of sharp swings of the exchange
policy over the competitive edge of countries, as is the present
case in the relationship between the Euro and the U.S. dollar. 7
These sharp movements affect the level of effective import pro-
tection envisaged when the tariff was bound in the WTO. For
example, by having a de facto negative import protection. The
same reasoning applies to the applicable rules of some credit
disciplines. But there are no legal, short-term, or timely solu-
tions for this case within the WTO. So far, if you are an OECD,
an emerging country, or other high-cost economy facing these
problems, instead of seeking that kind of solution after exhaust-
ing the options coming from increases in productivity, you try to
solve this political and socio-economic problem by pushing a
package of non-trade concerns, for example. This is not serious
nor the way out of a real problem that has been permanently
with us.
In 1947, the drafters of GATT foresaw, very generally, this
kind of issues (Articles 11:3 and XV:4). But there are no efficient
legal remedies to it in the WTO Agreement. Of course, I do not
think that solutions are easy from the technical point of view,
nor can it be justified in any situation related to a lack of com-
36. See WTO Agreement art. XVII.
37. A devaluation of around 29% in a few months is not a marginal problem for
trade operations.
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petitive abilities different from those mentioned. It is another
complex and high priority concern that requires mature
thought.
Solving these type of concerns would create some fresh air
in the presently available WTO disciplines and procedures
aimed at establishing the actual cost and price of trade opera-
tions and the existence of inner subsidies and many other prac-
tices that are expressions of unfair and unrealistic situations any-
where. It also has to be accepted that people looking for the
approval of a broad, non-trade agenda are saying exactly the
same thing but looking at solutions that could severely under-
mine the goals of the System or the System itself. They did not
mention these as the real hard choices before us, nor that it
would be a tremendous error to keep disguising them under
alien motivations. Trade problems have to be solved by unam-
biguous, genuine, trade policy answers. Everybody knows that
such is hardly the real force behind many of the proposals tabled
over the last decade on these issues.
If there is good faith and interest in an eventual discussion
of this nature, nobody can expect to confuse the adjustments
that could be contemplated in the relevant disciplines affected,
with a twisted attempt of impairing the competitive hedge that
comes from fair, comparative, and competitive advantages of the
countries and regions where they exist.
The same explicit approach should be able to deal with
market access of goods and services. How can a trading system
that has disciplines and commitments ruling over most eco-
nomic activities not have specific commitments and disciplines
in sectors like water and air transportation and electronic com-
merce? Is it not odd to have in the WTO a broader push for
labor standards and civil society participation than for core in-
struments of trade policy covering the backbone sectors of mod-
ern trade?
A separate issue that has to be tackled very soon is Members
support to one of the finest Secretariats in the world. It has a
small, top quality, and hard working staff. But the lack of eco-
nomic incentives and the frustrating working climate that has
been prevailing in the last years for its staff needs to be over-
come urgently.
In addition, the System cannot afford the repetition of an-
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other selection process for the Director-General with the un-
helpful, political characteristics that were registered when Mike
Moore, Supachai Panitchpakdi, and their team of Deputy Direc-
tors General were elected.
C. The Agenda for the Next Negotiations
If all of the required political decisions to support the Sys-
tem and the launching of a realistic and comprehensive round
of negotiations can be adopted in a timely manner, the WTO
could easily regain its confidence and face most of the present
challenges posed by the business community and the rest of the
civil society. I have submitted a few additional methodological
reflections on how to meet these goals. (There is a deliberate
omission of a specific trade agenda or of sectoral initiatives).
1. Procedural Issues
The agenda of a new round should only contain issues re-
lated to Uruguay Round mandated negotiations (built-in
agenda), implementation, the Singapore package as well as
other issues for which there are clearly defined, and accepted
TOR and clear horizontal deadlines. The process should be car-
ried out under the principle of a single undertaking. The fate of
issues that belong to the built-in agenda (agriculture, services,
implementation) should not be linked to the willingness of
launching a more comprehensive round; that credit already was
paid before and nobody can expect the acceptance of double
charge for the same asset or commitment. It is one thing to say
that it would be better and politically more comfortable to have
a comprehensive negotiating approach and another to take for
granted that, if there is not a full fledged round, the existing
rights covered by the built in agenda could be ignored. This
kind of precedent could affect other processes and all categories
of commitments in the future.
To avoid some exclusions, the issues that might drag on for
a period that go beyond the general deadline set for the main
negotiations should be left out from the "single undertaking"
and subject to individually agreed deadlines if by the time that is
due (the general deadline), it remains clear through consulta-
tions that there would be no agreement on them. The negotia-
tions on these issues could be still retained for extra time, setting
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a new date by consensus, but they would not affect the approval
of the main package under the single undertaking traditional
rules. Issues in this category (e.g., Trade and Investment, Com-
petition, and others) are for different reasons sensitive to many
Members. The same method should be applied to non-trade
concerns that could eventually gather momentum under agreed
TOR and critical mass for their support (I will not elaborate on
the definition of critical mass for this purpose) such as, or per-
haps mainly, trade and environmental issues.
So, the single undertaking of a new round could have two
speeds. Box one would cover the Uruguay Round mandated ne-
gotiations and implementation, the non-controversial Singapore
issues (under the conditions mentioned above), and others.
Box two could cover issues having agreed TORs, but subject to
reservations; that second category of issues would jump condi-
tionally to box one with the clarification that they would only
retain its box one status until a consultation could be held on a
particular date.
The negotiations in this category should cover only
problems related to lack of or faulty enforcement of existing dis-
ciplines and market access related commitments. They should
not cover a redrafting of "the accuracy" of the goals of the origi-
nal disciplines themselves, which is a problem that has to be
dealt with in the groups that are negotiating or will negotiate
new rules if there is consensus for it. While it can be admitted
that sometimes this distinction is not easy to draw, no Member
should pretend to discuss the implementation of a mistake or a
goal not achieved in a previous negotiation.
2. Substantive Aspects of Negotiations
An important effort should be made to avoid the implicit
and perhaps involuntary change of core rules and principles.
For example, the proposals on reviewing the SPS Agreement text
and its implicit procedures can and must follow the provisions of
Article 12(7) of the Agreement,38 a decision that at present
might be made anytime not necessarily in the framework of the
negotiations started in February 2000 or in a new negotiating
round. The SPS Committee can do thisjob anytime, if it is possi-
ble to reach a consensus on that. The Agreement on Technical
38. See WTO Agreement art. 12(7).
2000] 605
606 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:572
Barriers to Trade 9 ("TBT Agreement"), the SPS Agreement,
and other Agreements have been drafted as a self-contained
texts and that status should not change due to a conceptual mis-
take.
Politicizing the present and future negotiations could only
stall further the System. In GATT Article XVI(3)4 ° and in Article
18(5) of the Agreement on Agriculture, 41 there are clear exam-
ples of wrong disciplines like the discussion on what is "having
more than an equitable share of world export trade." This ap-
proach leads to nowhere and entails unacceptable subjectivity.
As proof of this statement, after more than fifty years of the Sys-
tem, is that market-sharing provisions were never a basis of iden-
tifiable and applicable obligations and, in some way, they contra-
dict the notion of fair competition and objective, legally accept-
able advantages. The problem with those kinds of situations and
legal irregularities is that in certain situations panels and the Ap-
pellate Body, not trade negotiators and drafters of the rules, are
making the rules; this is another core conceptual mistake.
WTO Members should avoid keeping legal vacuums. Re-
vised or new disciplines should not include, at least without defi-
nition of its scope and the applicable practical procedures to en-
force rights and obligations and concepts like "due restraint"42
that can mean anything and in practice they mean very little.
One of the most important short-term issues is the avoid-
ance of further delays in solving issues that had to be dealt with
by the time of the failed Third Ministerial Conference. These
issues are now part of a legal limbo and confrontational situa-
tions (e.g., the validity of Article 8 of the Subsidies Agreement43
and the extension of the transitional TRIMS provisions).
CONCLUSION
The next twelve months will be crucial to keep the MTS
alive and well. It is my view that a strong effort should be made
39. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final-e.htm.
40. GATT art. XVI(3).
41. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 18(5), WTO Agreement, An-
nex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/finale.htm.
42. Agreement on Agriculture art. 13.
43. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/final-e.htm.
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to avoid messing around with the finest tool that has made trade
disciplines and trade liberalization an instrument that serves ex-
tremely well economic expansion, sustainable development and
world peace. Nobody has the moral right to stay indifferent in
achieving these crucial goals.
